Table of contents

  1. About me
  2. Fields of expertise
  3. Infosec Talks and presentations
  4. “Proper” Academic Papers
  5. Blog posts and other publications
  6. MSc Thesises I have supervised
  7. Open-source code
  8. Now-defunct products I worked on

About me

I am a trained mathematician who skews heavily toward computer science and programming - to an extent that I am now more a mathematical computer scientist than a computing mathematician. I started reverse engineering software as a teenager, and have always kept a keen interest in all aspects of low-level programming, program analysis, compilers etc.

My professional work has been centered on computer security. Areas that I have sunk substantial time into are:

  • Identifying vulnerabilities in software (both when source code is available, and when only binaries are available).
  • Comparing executables (for both malware and vulnerability research).
  • Similarity search over large databases (many billions) of graphs
  • Mechanisms of exploiting such vulnerabilites.
  • Analyzing mitigations for vulnerabilities and their effectiveness.
  • Theoretical foundations for software vulnerabilities. What precisely is a vulnerability, and what precisely is an exploit?

In 2004, I started a company called zynamics that built highly specialized reverse engineering tools. We won an important research prize with our work in 2006, and grew the company to about a dozen employees. One of our products (BinDiff) became an industry standard and even a verb. In 2011, Google acquired the company, and I spent the next 5 years integrating our technology and team into Google.

In 2015, I was awarded the lifetime achievement Pwnie award.

From 2016 to the end of 2018 I worked as a researcher in Google’s Project Zero, one of the leading computer security research teams.

As of January 2019 I have left Google and am one of the co-founders of optimyze, a company that helps optimize cloud workloads against a commission (“we help you compute more efficiently, save you money, and take a cut of the savings”). I am rather excited about the new venture.

Fields of expertise/experience

Over the years of doing research, starting/running a company, and then leading a team in a large multinational, I have acquired quite a bit of experience in a variety of areas:

  • Technical experience:

    • Reverse engineering of malicious software (userspace and kernelspace)
    • Reverse engineering of COTS software
    • Security analysis of software (C/C++)
      • Vulnerability discovery
      • Exploit development
      • Tooling to assist in both of the above
    • Exploitation of hardware reliability flaws (Rowhammer)
    • Engineering of large-scale distributed systems (particularly for malware analysis)
    • Large-scale analysis of executable code (both large in terms of volume and in terms of inidividual size)
    • Static analysis, formal methods
    • Applying mathematics/statistical inference/machine-learning to real-world problems
  • Management experience:

    • Product conception, design, and engineering (BinDiff, BinNavi, VxClass) - going all the way from idea to “bringing to market”
    • Building and leading engineering teams
    • Training cybersecurity experts on vulnerability discovery, exploit development, reverse engineering and malware analysis
    • Technical roadmapping to improve the defensive posture of a very large organisation
    • Transitioning a small team (9 people) through an acquisition; integrating the team & technology in a very large organisation

Talks and presentations

I have given quite a large number of presentations over the years and nearly two decades that I have been involved in computer security. Below is a list of those that I can remember / find evidence for, in reverse chronological order.

I have tried to link videos and slides (if I could find any), as well as a brief synopsis of what I remember the important point of the talk was.

My year 2019 has a sharp drop-off in the number of talks compared to previous years; my wife and me have a child now and I have decided to travel & talk much less.

2019

FinOps Foundation Meeting: Fin(Dev)Ops: Beyond rightsizing and RI-planning A talk in which I explain my rationale for my new company, optimyze.cloud AG: The end of Moore’s Law and Dennard scaling, combined with the move to the cloud and the continued digital transformation of society, presents some unique opportunities: Computational efficiency will start to matter again, and there is the possibility of doing good while doing well in helping organisations deliver their digital services more cheaply (and hence more efficient in terms of energy and other resources).

Some event, had to cancel due to birth of first child that day: A crash-course in cyber

An attempt at making a very succinct, 12-slide presentation that brings people not well-versed in the realm of cybersecurity up to speed on the unique challenges of that realm.

CODE Colloquium: https://www.unibw.de/code/events-u/computer-security-exploits-and-the-weird-machine

Another iteration of the Oxford weird machine talk, this time at the Cyber Defense institute of the German Armed Forces University.

2018

HITB Bejing: The good 0(ld) days

Slightly modified talk from beVX.

beVX Conference Hong Kong: The good 0(ld) days

A talk about some of the research I did while at Project Zero, focused on automatically discovering statically-linked library functions in binaries and highly efficient similarity searches over large quantities of code.

A technical talk that covers most of the ground also covered in the corresponding blog post.

SSTIC 2018, Keynote: Closed, heterogenous platforms and the (defensive) reverse engineers dilemma

The slides are here. A talk where I complain about the state of tooling in reverse engineering, and how it feels like insufficient progress has been made in the last 20 years. The talk borrows from previous talks - the BSides Zurich talk about exploit economics, and the CyCon keynote about escalating complexity.

I criticize the proliferation of half-finished tools, the difficulty of interaction with them, and the general lack of progress.

Btw, about 1 year later, I am a bit more optimistic - the open-sourcing of GHIDRA seems to have created a bit of momentum behind one major framework.

CyCon Talinn 2019, Keynote: Security, Moore’s law, and the anomaly of cheap complexity

I was invited to Keynote CyCon, and my talk was supposed to be right before Bruce Schneier’s talk. I tried hard to make a talk that is accessible to people with a non-technical and non-engineering background, which nonetheless summarized the important things I had learnt about security. The core points are:

  1. CPUs are much more complex than 20 years ago, the feeling of being overwhelmed by complexity is not an illusion.
  2. We are sprinkling chips into objects like we are putting salt on food.
  3. We do this because complexity is cheaper than simplicity. We often use a cheap but complex computer to simulate a much simpler device for cost and convenience.
  4. The inherent complexity/power of the underlying computer has a tendency to break to the surface as soon as something goes wrong.
  5. Discrete Dynamical Systems and computers share many properties, and tiny changes have a tendency to cause large changes quickly.

This may be the most polished talk I have ever given – I did multiple dry-runs with different audiences, and bothered everybody and his dog with the slides.

I am particularly proud that Bruce Schneier seemed to have liked it; this is a big thing for me because reading “Applied Cryptography” and “A self-study course in block-cipher cryptanalysis” had a pretty significant impact on my life.

RuhrSec 2018: Weird machines, exploitability, and provable unexploitability

A re-run of the Oxford Seminar talk.

Cyber Security Seminar Oxford: Weird machines, exploitability, and provable unexploitability

At the beginning of 2018 I finally managed to get my long-in-the-making paper about the weird machine formalism published. The final version of the paper is rather dense, so I gave a few talks that give a less heavy-handed, less formal explanation of the topic.

T2.fi Keynote: Risks, damned lies, and probabilities

A keynote in which I venture like the amateur that I am into the realm of risk modelling, and talk a bit about proper scoring rules, probabilities, and incentives in security.

2017

Zeronights Moscow, 2017, Keynote: Machine Learning, Offense, and the future of Automation

After having done a lot of reading about Machine Learning / AI on my sabbatical and after returning to Google, I gave this keynote where I tried to condense the key “tricks” that make a lot of modern ML work into one talk (Automatic differentiation, high-dimensional nearest neighbor search, Monte Carlo Tree Search). In the second half I examine why common areas where ML/AI is applied defensively violate fundamental assumptions needed to make it work reliably (stability of input distribution), and argue that defenders should focus on solving tasks where this stability is given vs. the sexy task where they have an adversary that breaks their assumptions.

The talk was contentious / provocative with people that work on products that apply AI in adversarial scenarios, but I stand by the key message (e.g. use AI/ML when you have a reasonably stable target distribution and no adversary that can modify it at will).

FIRST Puerto Rico, 2017: [Finding an Intruder in a 10TB haystack: The benefits of similarity searching]

A talk about similarity searching algorithms and how it is pretty easy to bootstrap code similarity search, image similarity search, and other similarity searches by using MinHashing or SimHashing.

BSides Zurich, 2017, Keynote: Repeated vs. single-shot games in security

A quick and reasonably amusing keynote about the fact that the security community often thinks in terms of single-shot games and does not take the long-term dynamics of iterated games into account. This has a number of interesting consequences:

  1. Most mitigations do not quite provide the same benefit as people think.
  2. “Raising the bar” on exploitation may counterintuitively lead to worse long-term security.
  3. Cost of exploit development against the same target is almost monotonically falling.
  4. The 0day vendor business model may actually benefit from raising 0day prices due to inflexible demand.

DIMVA 2017, Keynote: What happens when someone writes an exploit?

Essentially a re-run of the weird machine talk I had given in November 2016 in Switzerland. I very distinctly remember the difficulty I had in giving this talk, because I was re-using the earlier slides although my understanding of the formalism had evolved quite a bit.

Blackhat Asia 2017 Keynote: Why we are not building a defendable internet

After the relatively optimistic engineering tone of my “Re-architecting a defendable Internet”-talk, I felt it was important to emphasize that - while the engineering problems seem surmountable - the organisational and economic problems for security are particularly tricky. The slides were done in a bit of a rush (I think the final version is here), but the talk was none-the-less well-received.

The talk examines the economics (and failures) of the security product market: Why most security products, while not improving security per-se, provide a benefit to the purchaser (who is tasked with buying products to ‘produce’ security, but can’t do it).

To this day, I think it is a good talk, and important for understanding why the security product market is somewhat pathological.

2016

Cyber Security Alliance: What happens when someone writes an exploit

I was writing my weird machine paper at the time, and this seems to be my first attempt at publicly talking about it. The content mutated a lot over the next 18 months until the paper was finally published.

The archive.org link is provided because the entire conference seems to have fallen off the internet.

O’Reilly Security Conference Amsterdam: Re-architecting a defendable Internet

My first talk after the end of my sabbatical, describing how I imagine a way forward to build devices that could actually be defended in a reasonable manner. The talk was recorded, but is paywalled unfortunately. The slides are here.

The core of the talk is that we need to build hardware support for hashing all the code in a device, and a public ledger to see that the code running on the device is actually the code that the vendor avows.

Some informal event in Singapore: 3 Things Rowhammer taught me

During my sabbatical, my wife and me travelled through Singapore, and I was asked to give a short talk. I had spent a fair bit of time thinking through my experience with Rowhammer (which had been very educational - on the technical front, on the organisational front, and on the economic front). This talk tries to condense my lessons from Rowhammer:

  1. We need a proper theory of exploitation. This is me reminding myself to invest the time to formalize the informal things I presented during my Infiltrate 2011 keynote.
  2. Hardware is not properly analyzed for worst-case behavior, and is only average- case deterministic. Research into chip faults due to manufacturing process variation looks extremely interesting.
  3. The importance of building systems that can be inspected if we wish to reach defendable systems.

2015

Blackhat Briefings 2015 (with Mark Seaborn, who did most of the work): Exploiting the DRAM Rowhammer Bug to Gain Kernel Privileges

The talk to present the work that had been published in the blog post previously. I am co-presenting with Mark Seaborn, who really did 90% of the research work on this. My only actual technical contribution was double-sided hammering, and proposing PTE spraying (and then learning that someone else had proposed PTE sprays earlier).

2014

Area41 Zurich Keynote: Why Johnny can’t tell if he is compromised

The original speech blurb:

It is 2014, and Bob Morris Sr. old golden rules of computer security still apply: “Do not own a computer; do not power it on; and do not use it.” It has become clear over the last years that we are quickly moving toward a world full of computers which are simultaneously under the control of multiple parties whose interests may diverge (or even be diametrically opposed). Possession and ownership take on very bizarre shapes - mostly because it is practically impossible for anybody to determine whether he is actually “in possession” of his own computing infrastructure.

This talk examine the technical reasons why I can’t tell if I am in control of my own computing infrastructure, and highlight all the things that would need to be changed to fix it.

ISACA Nordic Conference Keynote: Hacking and addiction

A talk about the network effects in hacking - how the number of machines you have compromised enlarges your “compromise boundary”, e.g. the number of machines you can easily compromise next - and about the fundamental addictiveness of an activity where your success accelerates with past successes. The talk ends with comments about the necessity of code-signing transparency.

2013

Syscan 2013: Checking the boundaries of static analysis

This is probably the talk where I most mis-aligned talk content to audience, and I feel guilty to the conference organizers to this day.

The talk discusses some trends at the time in the academic research sector about the confluence of abstract interpretation and SMT solvers, e.g. areas where the two interact constructively.

The talk covers issues of myopic analysis and how “most precise transforms” can be synthesized using solvers, it discusses issues of heap-cell summarization, and a few other topics. Most importantly, it discusses all the things where static analysis has a very hard time providing results.

The talk would have been good to give at a seminar for people embarking on a static analysis PhD, but it was very ill-suited for Syscan, and fell very flat on it’s face. Quite possibly the worst talk I have given. Sorry, Thomas Lim.

SOURCE Dublin 2013 Keynote: Piracy, Privateering, and the creation of a new Navy

A talk about the parallels between the geopolitical situation during the time of the Spanish Main (the 1500-1600s after the discovery of the new world) and the current times on the internet, particularly with regards to Hackers and their relationship to the military. A good talk that captured a thought that had been floating around, and was lateron studied seriously by others. Amusingly, the NYT ran an op-ed titled “An Elizabethian Cyberwar” about a week after my talk, using the same analogy I had used. I was assured that this was coincidence, so my talk must have verbalized some part of the collective unconcious at the time.

GreHack 2013 Invited Talk: The many flavors of binary analysis

A sort-of survey-slash-recruitment talk where I discuss the many different areas that one can tackle when doing binary analysis - fuzzing, abstract interpretation, SMT solvers, etc. etc.

Touches on a few topics that occupied my mind at the time, primarily the “myopic analysis” of many binary abstract interpreters, and the issue of heap cell summarization for use-after frees.

2012

Hashdays 2012 Switzerland: Things one wants from a heap visualisation tool

Proper heap visualization is one of my pet topics that many people have difficulty relating to. I was introduced to heap visualisation as part of the exploit development process in 2004 by Gerardo Richarte, who released his tool a few years later (you can still find a copy of it on archive.org).

For me, the tool was a revelation, and I built my own version during my time at zynamics. I have never done any heap exploitation without such a visualizer post-2004.

Interestingly, the entire approach seems to be quite polarizing: Of all the vuln-dev people I have interacted with, about 5-10% swear by having the visualizer and would not want to live without it, and 90% are like “meh, what is this for?”.

Anyhow, building a good heap visualizer is not easy, and in 2012 I was frustrated with the non-availabilty of anything useful. As a result, I gave this talk, which outlines both what you would need from a good heap visualizer, and some of the engineering challenges involved with it. I had hoped somebody would take this as an invitation to build one, but I was not so lucky :-)

I did end up writing a (not good, extremely yanky) heap visualizer for 64-bit address spaces in 2016 during two weeks of my sabbatical, but it is very much the minimum I needed to finish my exploit, not the well-rounded tool I asked for in this talk.

2011

Infiltrate 2011 Keynote: Exploitation and state machines

After the extremely stressful Google/zynamics acquisition, I gave a talk in Miami where I outlined some of my thoughts about the proper mental model for exploitation. I had heard the term “weird machine” for the first time during an informal lecture Sergey Bratus had given, and my experience in exploit writing between 2008 and 2011 had allowed my thoughts to mature a lot.

The recording of this keynote is sadly lost, but I think it is one of my better talks, and contains a few goodies, so I will summarize the important points:

  1. A theoretical part about weird machines:
    • A reasonable (if informal) explanation of what a ‘weird machine’ is.
    • Why the existence of the weird machine leads to mitigation bypasses.
    • The importance of the set-up and initial states.
    • “Infoleaks are made, not found” - an important sentence at the time, because many people thought that ASLR implies that one needs to find an information leak in addition to a regular bug. Weird machines allow you to construct one.
  2. A concrete part about a Spidermonkey-byte-code-spray
    • Instead of JIT-spraying, the talk discusses how one can byte-code-spray for modern JS engines, obtaining near-native code execution; essentially obviating NX memory.
    • Some “stunt exploitation” – a story of how I exploited a bug that most sane researchers would have discarded. Probably the beginning of my love affair with really shitty bugs.
  3. A long part about “implicit state machines”. This needs to be read as a long- winded criticism of the ‘automated exploit generation’ papers that were fashionable in academia at the time; in essence, various authors claimed that making a target application execute a particular program path was just a matter of solving path constraints. I had subscribed to a similar superstition until 2006 until I had run face-first into the “implicit state machine” (e.g. the state machine of the application that may make a particular program path impossible). Knowing better, I was very annoyed with academia doing their best to ignore this roadblock in order to not jeopardize paper acceptance.
  4. A discussion of “crackaddr”, the memory corruption from sendmail reduced to an absolute minimum. Triggering it requires taking a particular path through a state machine, and it is still to this day an excellent example of the sort of bugs that are hard to deal with automatically. Progress has been made, but my view is that this progress does not generalize well to variations of this loop (e.g. without the accidental linear invariant, and with larger values for BUFFERSIZE).
  5. A short part about how inherent approximation problems in abstract interpretation, e.g. the inherent cascading loss of precision due to overapproximation. This gets short shrift in the talk but is actually a deep insight: The spin-out-of-control nature of weird machines makes sound approximation by overapproximating states escalate the imprecision. I will probably write a blog post about this in the future.

Anyhow, this is one of the talks I am proudest of, content-wise, even though one could have probably made 4 separate single-topic talks out of it. I was clearly anxious and trying to impress. It is also the first in a series of keynotes that make up a greater portion of my talks since 2011.

2010

Virus Bulletin 2010: Challenging conventional wisdom on byte signatures

One of the cool side-effects of the algorithms that Christian Blichmann developed as part of his MSc thesis was the surprising length of these signatures: We got way more than strictly needed. As a side-effect, we could cut one “master signature” into many fragments, all of which with comparable false-positive rate.

The upshot of this was that some signatures could be used for detection, others could be used for monitoring whether detection was being bypassed. This talk discussed the algorithms & approaches.

CanSecWest 2010: ShaREing is caring

Collaboration, knowledge management and data exchange between reverse engineers has always been a huge problem. During our time at zynamics, we recognized this problem, and after we had gained some experience with hashing control-flow-graphs, we realized that this leads to an easy method of exchanging function names via a centralized server.

This talk presented BinCrowd, a product we sold for a while that allowed the exchange of function names and comments between many users of diverse RE tools.

NATO IST Conference that was cancelled 2010: Automated Attacker Correlation for Malicious Code

Strictly speaking, this should not be listed under talks - we got our paper accepted at the conference, and it was supposed to be presented, but the conference was cancelled.

T2.fi Helsinki 2010: How to notice if you are re-owned

A talk about automated signature generation, malware classification, and how to use the ability of generating large quantities of signatures.

2009

There seems to be no trace of me giving public talks in 2009 - if you find evidence of a talk I gave, please contact me :-)

2008

Hack.lu 2008: Various ways of classifying malware

A talk that surveyed some malware classification approaches and discussed ours at the time.

RSA 2008: Unknown title, something about malware classification?

I must have spoken at RSA in 2008. I remember visiting San Francisco, and having a rather nice lunch & chat somewhere, but I do not remember anything about the talk. Neither does the internet.

2007

Bluehat 2007: [Structural Classification of Malware] ()

I suspect this was a re-run of the DeepSec talk.

Blackhat Asia 2007: [Automated unpacking and Malware Classification] ())

I suspect this was a re-run of the DeepSec talk.

DeepSec 2007: Automated structural classification of malware

A talk which describes using BinDiff-style algorithms for malware classification, after surveying what other people were doing.

2006

Bluehat 2006: BinDiff Analysis

I presented about patch diffing to various Microsoft folks at Bluehat.

Blackhat USA 2006: RE 2006: New Challenges Need Changing Tools

It appears that the slides for this talk are lost (in slide format), but do exist as part of the video recording. This talk can best be described as a “keynote slipped into a conference under the guise of a research talk”: The talk lists a number of problems that I wanted to see solved, and sometimes provided a rough sketch on how I would go about solving the problem.

It contains a nicely broad definition of reverse engineering, and a number of interesting ideas that I would still like to see solved:

  • #1 and #2: Automated data structure recovery; building UML inheritance diagrams from binaries.
  • Coupling the above with a debugger to allow run-time object inspection and editing.
  • #3: Automated modularization of binaries (decomposing binaries to recover library structure / groupings).
  • #4: De-templating of heavily templated C++ code.
  • #7: “Normal forms” for sequences of code (a Groebner-base equivalent?)
  • #8: A visualization for callgraphs that shows each node as a Poset to make sure the order of outgoing edges is visualized, too.
  • 9#: Recovery of the internal state machine of a target.
  • 10#: Semantics-based FLIRT-style library identification.

Interestingly, challenge #5 - automated input data creation - is the one where most progress has happened since the talk. To my great amusement, this talk suggests the use of SAT solvers to do it. At that time, I was obviously unaware at the time of the research on SMT that is happening and will lead to Vijay Ganesh’s great 2007 thesis (and the release of STP).

DEF CON 14: RE 2006: New Challenges Need Changing Tools

This talk is the same as the corresponding Blackhat talk.

CanSecWest 2006: More on Uninitialized Variables

The contents of this talk have been lost; I presume it was similar to the other uninitialized variable talks I gave in 2006.

Blackhat Europe 2006 - Amsterdam: Attacks on Uninitialized Local Variables

A re-run of the DC talk.

Blackhat DC 2006 - Washington DC: Attacks on Uninitialized Local Variables

A talk where I discuss my attempts at properly initializing an uninitialized stack buffer in a given target function. The research was inspired by some spellunking I had done with a friend in a then-popular IKE implementation; we had a good uninitialized stack variable bug in it and then struggled with populating it with good data.

2005

T2 Helsinki Diff, Navigate, Audit

My first trip to Finland, and a great conference where I was introduced to Ero Carrera, who would later join me at zynamics and be instrumental in starting the development of VxClass.

SSTIC 2005: Comparaison structurelle d’object executables

Rolf Rolles and me had made a lot of progress with the core BinDiff algorithms between the DIMVA publication and early 2005 - Rolf had contributed a few critical ideas that greatly improved the ability to perform matching of basic blocks.

This paper is a description of BinDiff ca. 2005 including these new methods. It is also the only conference talk I ever gave in French, and because I was terrified of doing it, it is probably the talk I practiced most in my life.

Blackhat Europe, 2005: Compare, Port, Navigate

A joint talk with Rolf Rolles about BinDiff, diffing patches, porting symbols, and using coverage information & interactive graph visualization for reverse engineering / vulnerability research.

2004

DIMVA 2004: Structural comparison of executable objects

My first academic publication was presented at DIMVA in 2004 in Dortmund.

DefCon 12, USA, 2004: Take it from here

A joint talk with Fx at DefCon about vulnerability research. I have almost no memory of the content of the talk.

Blackhat Hat USA, 2004: Diff, Navigate, Audit

At some point in spring 2004, I started what was then called “SABRE Security”, and what would later become zynamics. This talk describes BinDiff, and a proto-BinNavi (essentially an IDE for reverse reverse engineering centered around interactive graph visualisation, coverage analysis, and differential debugging, and some ideas for “BinAudit”, the static binary analyzer that we never got around to building. It also uses the company logo for the first time.

Blackhat Hat Windows, 2004: Automated Reverse Engineering

As far as I can tell, largely a re-run of the talk given at Blackhat Asia, with some more practical examples – using BinDiff for reverse engineering a particular patch in the Windows messenger service.

2003

Blackhat Asia, 2003: Automated Reverse Engineering

A two-part talk: The first half discusses IDC scripts that identify bad usage of common C functions, followed by a discussion of the design criteria for the IL I was using at the time. The second half discusses methods to identify memory-copying loops, followed by a discussion of the BinDiff algorithm as it was in 2003.

Blackhat Europe, 2003: Data flow analysis

It appears the slides are lost, but from what I can tell in the video, the content is largely identical with the “More fun with graphs” talk.

Blackhat Federal, 2003: More fun with graphs.

Apparently the first presentation where I talk about a proto-BinDiff. This is interesting, because I had misremembered to not have started work on this prior to fall 2003, but I must have been off by quite a bit. The second half of the talk shows some slides with the first binary-IL that I wrote – it is clearly inspired by SPARC (input and output registers), and I had to learn the hard lesson that IDA cannot be trusted to always produce correct stackframes – and that hence an IL that requires stack analysis to be correct first is not terribly useful.

There’s some amount of proto-REIL visible if you squint enough. And I do wonder what happened to the code for that translation engine.

Blackhat Windows, 2003: Graph-based binary analysis AFAICT a re-run of the previous talk, most likely with slightly changing examples.

2002

Blackhat Asia, 2002: Graph-based binary analysis. AFAICT a re-run of the talk from Las Vegas that same summer.

Blackhat USA, 2002: Professional Source Code Auditing - Video. Personally, one of my favorite talks - jointly with Mark Dowd, Chris Spencer, Nishad Herath, and Neel Mehta. The talk discusses the security implications of pre-malloc integer overflows in some depth, and was one of the first public discussions thereof. Integer overflows had been the worst-kept secret in the offensive community at the time for a while. The talk concluded with a “bug quiz” - bugs where shown on slides, and whoever spotted the bug was (privately) told the name of the software.

Blackhat USA, 2002: Graph-based binary analysis - Video. A talk in which I talk about incrementally deleting pieces of a CFG while performing manual reverse engineering, complain about (then-current) IDA not handling non-contiguous functions, and (perhaps most interestingly) talk about setting one-off breakpoints on basic blocks and feeding the information back into fuzzers to improve coverage (this was entirely manual at the time – observe coverage, then improve the fuzzer). This may have been one of the earlier mentions of the idea of using coverage to improve fuzzers.

CanSecWest, 2002: Graph-based-binary analysis From what I can tell, a pre-run to the talk in Las Vegas this summer.

Blackhat Windows, New Orleans, 2002: Third Generation Exploits on NT/Win2k Platforms. Apparently mostly a re-run of the BH Amsterdam talk from the previous fall. I remember this conference because I met Felix Lindner (‘FX’) for the first time here.

2001

Blackhat Amsterdam, 2001: Third Generation Exploits on NT/Win2k Platforms. Exploiting heap corruptions on Windows NT / Windows 2000, and exploiting format string bugs. A detour into exploit reliability in multi-threaded environments, and overwriting the SEH handler directly in the statically-mapped TEB (assuming the attacker can cause creation of new threads). “Thread grooming” if you want.

Blackhat USA, 2001: Hit them where it hurts - finding holes in COTS programs - Video. Pretty standard review of common vulnerable patterns in binary code; some IDC scripts to detect format string bugs; finding a real-world format string bug in CheckPoint Firewall’s management console; some IDC scripts to help reconstruct data structure layouts.

HAL 2001: Source code and binary code auditing. Joint talk with scut about source and binary auditing.

Blackhat Windows, 2001: Auditing Closed-Source Software - Video: Pretty standard review of common vulnerable patterns in binary code; some IDC scripts to detect format string bugs; finding a real-world format string bug in iWS (iPlanet Web Server, the artist formerly known as Netscape Enterprise) SHTML parsing code; some IDC scripts to help reconstruct data structure layouts.

2000

17C3, Berlin, 2000: Exploiting format string vulnerabilities. A joint talk with scut about format string exploitation.

Blackhat Amsterdam, 2000: Auditing binaries for security vulnerabilities. My first conference talk - a number of IDC scripts that could be used to detect common broken coding patterns in binaries (such as a deficiency of arguments to a format-string-consuming function).

“Proper” academic papers

I sometimes (very rarely) write or co-author academic papers. Here is a list of publications I authored or co-authored:

WOOT 2010: A Framework for Automated Architecture-Independent Gadget Search Tim Kornau, Ralf-Philipp Weinmann, Thomas Dullien. A paper that grew out of Tim’s MSc thesis work.

INSCRYPT 2010: Algebraic precomputation in differential and integral cryptanalysis. Martin Albrecht, Carlos Cid, Thomas Dullien, Jean-Charles Faugère, Ludovic Perret. A paper to which I contributed a tiny idea with the other authors doing most of the heavy lifting.

ICML 2019: Graph Matching Networks for Learning the Similarity of Graph Structured Objects. Yujia Li, Chenjie Gu, Thomas Dullien, Oriol Vinyals, Pushmeet Kohli. A paper that grew out of a collaboration with the coauthors while I was at Google and them at Deepmind about the use of neural networks to learn algorithms for comparing graphs.

Cancelled NATO conference 2010: Automated attacker correlation for malicious code Thomas Dullien, Ero Carrera, Soeren Meyer-Eppler. A paper that grew out of our work on VxClass.

CanSecWest 2009: REIL: A platform-independent intermediate representation of disassembled code for static code analysis Thomas Dullien, Sebastian Porst. This paper did not undergo a normal academic peer-review process, but is cited quite a bit, so it should probably be listed here.

IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics in Computation: Weird machines, exploitability, and provable unexploitability Thomas Dullien. This paper is the closest thing to my “magnum opus” - e.g. I poured a lot of effort into it; writing it was important to me. The paper introduces the “right” way to think and reason about exploitability, and sets the stage for the understanding of exploitation as the process of steering a complicated discrete dynamical system.

DIMVA 2004: Structural comparison of executable objects The original BinDiff paper.

SSTIC 2005: Graph-based comparison of executable objects Thomas Dullien, Rolf Rolles. The updated and better original BinDiff paper.

Blog posts and other publications

I used to run a blog called ADD/XOR/ROL on Blogger.

There are still good blog posts there, but I will try to blog here instead in the future.

I also collaborated with Mara Tam and Vincenzo Iozzo on a paper about Wassenaar exploit export controls: Surveillance, Software, Security, and Export Controls

MSc Thesises I have supervised

In Germany, it is pretty common for MSc students to write their thesis in cooperation with industry, and during my time at zynamics we supervised a number of MSc theses. I am quite proud of some of the work the students (and often later co-workers) produced; some of the work still has impact more than a decade later.

2008: Automatisierte Signaturgenerierung fuer Malware-Staemme

Christian Blichmann’s thesis on automatic generation of byte signatures from groups of executables. Very good work - the ideas were part of our VxClass commercial product, and were re-implemented in 2017 by Cisco Talos here

2009: Return-oriented programming for the ARM architecture Tim Kornau’s thesis on ROP-for-ARM; a very good thesis that contains a lot of pieces that became “standard” later: Identifying suitable gadgets by examining intermediate language translations of the underlying assembly, considering all “free branches” (e.g. any branch with a user-controllable target, and not just returns) etc.

Open-source projects

FunctionSimSearch Code to calculate similarity-preserving hashes from disassembly control flow graphs, and to perform high-dimensional nearest-neighbor search over large indices of such graphs. More details about the code and what it does in this blog post

simple_simhash A pure ANSI-C implementation of calculating a SimHash over 4-byte tuples (including multiplicities) for a given byte stream. Simple and reasonably fast, no dynamic memory allocations (outside of some stack usage). Uses a counting bloom filter to count multiplicities while keeping memory consumption constant.

heap_history_viewer A C++ / OpenGL program to visualize diagrams of heap layouts. Very useful in exploit development.

Now-defunct products I worked on

BinNavi. A reverse-engineering IDE that I loved, and that had many features ahead of it’s time. Differential debugging, multi-user commenting, intermediate language for CPU-independent analysis, interactive flowgraph navigation – all features first seen here, and now standard in modern RE frameworks. Fell into disrepair after the acquisition by Google, since Google could not really justify developing a RE framework. Google eventually open-sourced it, but due to the use of a closed-source graph component not everything could be open-sourced – and with the release of Ghidra, there is little point in trying to repair BinNavi. I miss the tool, because it was very much taylored toward my personal reverse engineering workflow.

VxClass. The technology for which we got acquired. An antivirus-analyst-lab-in-a-box: Feed it large quantities of malware, it automatically discovered code-sharing relationships between them, identified clusters of related malware, and allowed automated generation of ClamAV signatures from groups of related malware. Parts of the technology live on, in heavily mutated form, somewhere inside Google to this day.

BinCrowd. A server-based solution to exchange symbol names - essentially a precursor to what is now “Illumia”, a standard feature of IDA Pro.